The Arctic region, as a focal point of ongoing geopolitical competition and complex security dynamics, is significantly influenced by the multifaceted impacts of Russia’s war against Ukraine. The current research project by HROMADA Steering Group member Maryna Rabinovych explores the regional and local ramifications of the war for Arctic Norway, in particular through interviews with regional and local officials and sectoral specialists in Troms and Finnmark counties. Based on this study, her blog post discusses ‘civil preparedness’ and ‘transport and infrastructure’ as potential areas of knowledge transfer between Ukraine and Norway. Her blog demonstrates that despite their geographical and contextual differences, Ukraine and the Norwegian Arctic share common challenges and opportunities in these areas.
The Arctic and Russia’s war against Ukraine
Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine has profoundly challenged the long-standing “High North, Low Tension” motto of Arctic security. Currently labeled in policy analysis as a manifestation of “Western wishful thinking”, this motto survived Russia’s military campaigns in Georgia (2008), Ukraine (since 2014) and Syria (2015). It was also carefully misused by Russia to shield its military build-up in the Arctic[i], such as the reconstruction of Soviet-era military bases close to its Western borders and the increased presence of the Northern fleet.
Nonetheless, Russia’s open and blatant disregard for international law in its war of aggression against Ukraine prompted the seven other Arctic states (Norway, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, the U.S. and Canada) to suspend their participation in the Arctic Council under Russian chairmanship (2021-2023). Some ad hoc cooperation between the seven other Arctic states and Russia (e.g., on search and rescue operations and climate and environmental monitoring) has nonetheless continued. In February 2024, a consensus was also reached to gradually resume project-level work within the six Arctic Council Working Groups, mainly focusing on environmental protection and sustainable development in the region. Informed by pragmatic needs, these developments may slightly reduce geopolitical tension, yet they remain far below the level of pre-war collaboration.
Another war-related development contributing to the contestation and militarisation of the Arctic region has been Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO amidst rising geopolitical tensions. Their accession led to NATO’s increased presence and capabilities in the region, brightly exemplified by the 2024 Nordic Response military exercise, co-hosted by Norway, Finland and Sweden. Coupled with the challenge of rapidly melting ice, NATO’s increased presence in the Arctic incentivises Russia to accelerate the remilitarisation of its territory in the region, as it competes with the alliance for strategic advantage.
Governance challenges in the Arctic and rationale for knowledge transfer with Ukraine
Intense geopolitical and security dynamics in the Arctic region create high governance demands for Norwegian authorities. Beyond the doubt, the Norwegian context is quite different from that of Ukraine, and there is no active conflict occurring in the Arctic. Nonetheless, geographical location, as well as the nature of the governance challenges faced by Norway and Ukraine and the responses such challenges require point to the usefulness of two-way knowledge transfer[ii] between Ukraine and Norway. Comparative analysis of Ukraine’s and Norway’s strategies for addressing such challenges can also be used by international organisations (e.g. the EU, NATO) to inform their policies:
- Presence of a land border with Russia as a shared challenge which requires military and civilian preparedness, expertise in crisis management, as well as developed infrastructure and contacts with neighboring countries in case a third-country assistance is required to address a cross-border crisis.
- Peripheral geographical location vis-à-vis the EU and its core member states. Ukraine is situated on the southeastern edge of Europe, bordering Russia and acting as a buffer between Russia and Europe. While geographically located in the northernmost part of Europe, Arctic Norway can be also seen as, though strategically important, a somewhat peripheral state vis-à-vis the EU’s political and economic core.
- Sense of urgency and need for rapid-response mechanisms. While in Ukraine the ongoing conflict is so far the key source of urgent challenges, Norwegian authorities are increasingly confronted with the multifaceted impacts of climate change, which is reshaping the Arctic region.
- Multilevel and multi-stakeholder coordination. Both in Ukraine and Arctic Norway, the urgency and complexity of challenges make it impossible to address them at a single level of governance and without coordination with private stakeholders, such as non-government organisations, volunteer movements and businesses.
- International engagement. Geopolitical challenges faced by Ukraine and Arctic Norway are of a cross-border nature and thus require both national authorities and those at regional and local levels to maintain constant contact with counterparts from neighbouring countries and international organisations.
Potential areas for knowledge transfer
Guided by these shared challenges, I suggest that Norwegian and Ukrainian actors focus on ‘civil preparedness’ and ‘transport and infrastructure’ as key thematic areas where knowledge transfer could prove most beneficial. Knowledge transfer activities can include information exchange between relevant actors (e.g. the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection (Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap) and the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs), joint seminars and workshops, mutual participation in preparedness exercises and cooperation on analytical materials. Whenever relevant in the context of Ukraine’s reconstruction, such activities may be eligible for funding under the Norwegian Nansen Support Programme for Ukraine. As lack of funding typically represents a challenge for transnational knowledge exchange activities, especially, at the regional and municipal levels, potential stakeholders may consider joint applications for EU funds, e.g. under Twinning and TAIEX capacity-building instruments.
Civil preparedness
Art. 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty requires NATO countries to maintain and develop their resilience, i.e. their individual and collective ability to resist major shocks, such as an armed attack or natural disasters. Alongside military capacity, civil preparedness is an essential element of resilience. Civil preparedness commonly refers to “all measures and means taken in peacetime, by national and Allied agencies, to enable a nation to survive an enemy attack and to contribute more effectively to the common war effort”. At the 2016 NATO Warsaw summit, the allies agreed about seven Baseline Requirements related to national resilience (in part related to civil preparedness against the full spectrum of possible crises: from an evolving hybrid threat up to the most demanding complex threats, such as a full-scale invasion by a third party):
| NATO Baseline Requirements of and for National Resilience |
| 1. Assured continuity of government and critical government services |
| 2. Resilient energy supplies |
| 3. Ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people |
| 4. Resilient food and water resources |
| 5. Ability to deal with mass casualties |
| 6. Resilient civil communications systems |
| 7. Resilient transport systems |
The 2023 Report of the Norwegian Total Preparedness Commission (Totalberedskapskomisjonen) addressed Norway’s ability to fulfill these requirements, as well as addressing further aspects of civil preparedness (e.g. digital security, continuity of satellite-based services and the preparedness of the financial system, especially financial services for citizens). The Report also stressed the particular importance of strengthening civil preparedness in the Norwegian Arctic, given the combined influence of long distances, negative demographic developments and climate change, as well as the region’s immediate proximity to Russia. In interviews, communal and regional stakeholders in the Arctic regions of Troms and Finnmark confirm that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine gave a strong impetus to the preparedness debate and planning activities in the area. Yet especially communal authorities acknowledge the challenges of allocating competences and organising cooperation with non-governmental actors, such as civil society and local businesses. They are also interested in organising more exercises to test local preparedness. If partners from Ukrainian municipalities and/or regional administrations are involved, such exercises can potentially become important forums for Norwegian actors to learn from Ukraine’s wartime experience.
At various stages of the full-scale war, Ukraine has faced multiple challenges to civil preparedness, ranging from attacks on energy infrastructure and cyber-attacks to the need to navigate large-scale internal displacement. The impact of these challenges across the country has been uneven, with municipalities and regional administrations facing distinct combinations of tasks and responsibilities. Both positive experiences of governance and multistakeholder coordination in addressing such challenges and those retrospectively labeled as mistakes (e.g. disordered evacuations), can inform Norway’s current civil preparedness efforts and serve as an endless source of plots for exercises at the communal and regional levels. A challenge to anticipate in this vein is that Ukrainian officials may not be willing to share negative experiences, especially if they eventually led to civilian casualties. It may therefore also be worth engaging with civil society and human rights defenders.
In turn, Norway’s total preparedness concept and efforts towards its implementation can be used to inform further strengthening of Ukraine’s civil preparedness, in particular in the context of post-war reconstruction. A particular aspect to consider is citizens’ involvement in communal planning and decision-making, which has traditionally received much attention in Norway. A possible challenge in this context concerns differences in political culture, so an additional ‘localisation’ effort may be needed to make Norwegian practices functional in the Ukrainian context.
Transport and infrastructure
As noted above, both Ukraine and Arctic Norway lie somewhat on Europe’s periphery both economically and politically, situated at its easternmost and northernmost borders respectively. Therefore, sustainable connectivity with neighbouring countries and the rest of Europe is central in both military and civilian terms. For wartime Ukraine, its Western border became a lifeline in many respects, ranging from weapons delivery to civilian evacuation and grain exports. In 2022, the European Commission launched the Solidarity Lanes initiative with a short-term objective of ensuring uninterrupted grain exports from Ukraine during wartime and a long-term goal of extending Europe’s Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) to Ukraine, as well as neighbouring Moldova. In 2023, both countries joined the Connecting Europe Facility, and Ukraine recently acquired EUR 52 million for the first four transport infrastructure projects related to railways, border crossing points, river information services, and air navigation. These should promote its integration into the TEN-T network and, if needed, potentially serve military mobility purposes.
Meanwhile, military mobility is receiving increased attention in the Nordic cooperation realm, in the context of Sweden and Finland’s accession to NATO and increasingly ambitious European military exercises in the Arctic. Norway, Sweden and Finland are thus working together on improved infrastructure for military mobility in the Arctic. Plans include strengthening the capacity of the Ofoten Line which runs from the port of Narvik to Riksgränsen on the Swedish-Norwegian border and continues via the Ore Line to Sweden’s northernmost towns of Kiruna and Luleå. Narvik’s ice-free port and associated rail and road networks are strategically critical for NATO and the EU, enabling Arctic access and facilitating iron ore exports from Kiruna to Europe.
In this light, both regions can benefit from knowledge transfer in realizing plans for better connectivity towards Europe’s core and facilitating mobility in connection with both military and civilian needs.
In conclusion, the shared geopolitical challenges and governance needs of Ukraine and Arctic Norway offer significant potential for knowledge transfer, particularly in civil preparedness and transport infrastructure. Ukraine’s experience in adapting to wartime pressures provides valuable lessons for Norway’s efforts in the Arctic. Conversely, Norway’s model of total preparedness, which emphasises multi-stakeholder coordination and citizen involvement, can be utilised in Ukraine’s post-conflict reconstruction. Potential challenges include national security concerns, a lack of openness and trust, complexity due to the multiplicity of involved actors on both sides and a lack of funding. Provided that stakeholders find ways to address such challenges and start with at least pilot projects, Ukrainian Norwegian exchange on civil preparedness, transport and infrastructure issues can enhance their resilience and contribute to broader European stability and innovation.
[i] In this blog, the terms ‘Arctic’ and ‘High North’ are used to address the whole Arctic region. The terms ‘Arctic Norway’ and ‘the Norwegian Arctic’ are used interchangeably to refer to the part of the Arctic region which belongs to Norway.
[ii] When using the term ‘knowledge transfer’, the blog post by default refers to two-way transfer of knowledge, i.e. from Ukraine to Norway and from Norway to Ukraine. When relevant, the text specifies that the learning process goes one-way.
