As peace talks between Russia and Ukraine have become more likely, it is necessary to understand how Ukrainians understand peace in the first place. For a long time, the Ukrainian perspective on peace and security in Europe has been sidelined. In this blog post Tyyne Karjalainen proposes that in order to leave behind the European security order that enabled Russia’s aggression in the first place, the perspective from the ‘peripheries’ should be placed at the forefront of imagining future peace and security in Europe.
The pre-war security order that prioritised Russian security interests over those of Ukraine did not sustain peace in Europe. To avoid repeating its mistakes and to craft a more enduring peace, the process of building a post-war security order in Europe should reflect the Ukrainian perspective instead. But what does peace mean for Ukrainians? The Ukrainian perspective continues to be missing from debates about peace in Ukraine (e.g., Khromeychuk 2022). This omission reflects a broader tendency to marginalise perspectives from Europe’s ‘peripheries’ in debates over the continent’s peace and security.
This blog post highlights two key factors: first, the importance of Ukraine’s allies recognising biases in the production of knowledge about the war and peace in Ukraine and second, key insights from Ukrainian scholars, analysts and authors, offering a perspective on peace rooted in Ukrainian experiences and viewpoints.
Knowledge about Russia’s war against Ukraine
According to Hendl (2022), people from ‘the East’ have long been framed as irrational, paranoid or biased in comparison to supposedly noble, rational and impartial Western experts. During the current war in Ukraine, academics have been selective in terms of what type of argumentation they welcome into the debate, and too often, Ukrainians supporting military resistance to Russia’s aggression have been perceived as ‘warmongers’ (Oksamytna 2023, 679). While Ukrainian voices have been sidelined, the wartime debate about Ukraine and the war has been shaped by ‘Westplaining’ among scholars and experts from Western centres (Sonevytsky 2022).
| Kazharski (2022) defines ‘Westplaining’ as “speaking without sufficient expertise but from a position of authority, often making false projections and assumptions that are based on the Western experience but are not necessarily relevant to the region in question” (n.p.). |
‘Westplaining’ has manifested as Russo-centrism, in applying the same structural theories in any context (Kazharski 2022), considering NATO’s expansion the main reason for the war or seeing Russia’s security concerns as relevant but not the rest of Eastern Europe’s (Smoleński and Dutkiewicz 2022).
The asymmetry in the production of knowledge is not only theoretical but has material consequences. Many believe the current war to be one such consequence. Gorodnichenko and others suggest that had there been a better understanding of the region before the war that was not overly Russocentric, it could have been avoided: “[K]nowledge is power. This includes the power to prevent wars by knowing who is capable of what, what to expect, and what is at stake” (2023, n.p.).
Key takeaways from Ukrainian authors
A comprehensive review of Ukrainian perspectives on peace is beyond the scope of this blog post, and as a non-Ukrainian author, my position inherently limits the breadth of this analysis, particularly due to language barriers. Nonetheless, I aim to spotlight key arguments and insights from Ukrainian researchers, authors, activists and political figures regarding the current war and the path to peace.
Yurchenko (2023, n.p.): “The peace demanded is violence”, and hence Ukrainians need to define their own peace
A central observation of many Ukrainian authors is that current calls for peace are not motivated by empathy for the victims of the war but rather by the negative effects that the war has on the global economy, prices and supply chains. Moreover, foreign proposals for peace in Ukraine are affected by Russian narratives and propaganda, framing events and developments based on imperial knowledge (Riabchuk 2023). The peace currently proposed for Ukraine could mean the continuation of the genocide of Ukrainians in occupied territories and rid Ukrainians of their collective identity (Yurchenko 2023).
Ukrainian analyses of the war generally caution against reducing the conflict to a mere territorial dispute (e.g., Riabchuk 2023). International supporters should resist presuming what Ukrainians see as an acceptable resolution, remaining open to unexpected or unconventional perspectives (Oliynyk 2024). Understanding what peace and war mean for Ukrainians requires consulting more than just the elites. Kurylo (2023 p. 688) emphasises that the perspectives of Ukrainians situated far from the “presumed centres of power” are especially prone to being overlooked.
She proposes bringing the everyday experiences and mundane wartime practices of Ukrainians to the centre of knowledge production about the war. Without analysing mundane experiences such as children’s wartime drawings, looted homes or other “everyday material horrors”, part of the catastrophe remains uncovered (Kurylo 2023).
Maslova’s (2023) linguistic analysis reveals that Ukrainian journalists often personify peace as beauty, perfection, and happiness yet also link it to war, frequently echoing the phrase “If you want peace, prepare for war”. Her analysis aligns with broader Ukrainian scholarship, which not only underscores the essence of peace but also stresses the critical importance of understanding the path to achieving a sustainable peace (e.g., Litra 2024).
Riabchuk (2023, 4): “[A]ll the war crimes and crimes against humanity should be properly investigated and criminals brought to court, and all the due reparations should be paid by the aggressor state”.
For now, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s peace formula stands as a particularly credible Ukrainian proposal for achieving peace. Broad in scope, it goes beyond restoring the nation-state’s territorial integrity to address key foundations of a peaceful, secure, and prosperous life both within Ukraine and internationally. These include nuclear safety, food security, energy security, prisoner release, and environmental protection, among other issues.
A key characteristic of President Zelenskyy’s peace formula is the call for a ‘just’ peace as opposed to simply ‘any’ peace. It calls for the investigation and punishment of war crimes and demands that Russia compensate for the war’s devastation. By contrast, China’s peace formula proposes that any peace in Ukraine should be supported by the international community.
Many argue that had Russia been punished for its violations in 2014, the current war could have been avoided (Zabuzhko 2022). Yurchenko (2023) and Bilous (2022) particularly criticise the Western ‘anti-war’ Left for failing to hold Russia accountable for its violence and crimes in Ukraine: “With this kind of ‘left’, how is one to fight for social justice?” (Yurchenko 2023, n.p.).
Pigul et al. (2022, n.p.): “[T]he essential difference between violence as a means of oppression and as a legitimate means of self-defense”.
The appeal by Pigul and others is part of a manifesto by Ukrainian feminists that responds to and criticises a previous international manifesto entitled ‘Feminist Resistance Against War’ (Smyth et al. 2022) for denying Ukrainians their right to self-defence. The perspective is central in Ukrainian analyses of the war: Ukraine does not have the ‘luxury’ of opting for pacifism – it is an option that one cannot afford under an imperialist invasion (Yurchenko 2023). Ukraine’s military resistance is in line with international law and agreements, while Russia’s objectives breach the same legal framework (Riabchuk 2023). This military resistance is thus perceived by Ukrainians as the only way toward sustainable peace.
Indeed, many Ukrainian authors stress that Ukrainians are not fighting at the behest of the United States but out of their own determination and agency. Interpretations suggesting otherwise undermine Ukrainian autonomy and belittle the profound sacrifices made in the struggle to “live in a free country” (Kukharskyy et al. 2022). The appropriate international framing of Ukraine’s self-defence lies in its historical context – namely, a “history of genocide, cultural oppression, and constant denial of the right to self-determination” (ibid, n.p.; see also Perepelytsia 2023).
On the other hand, the ability of Ukrainians to defend themselves depends on international military support. Many Ukrainians hold their international backers accountable for making the defence effort difficult: “[E]very coffee break you are taking during your discussions about how to interfere without provoking Putin to go further, costs someone’s life” (Zabuzhko, 2022, n.p.). Ukraine’s right to pursue NATO membership is interpreted in the context of the right to self-defence: a sovereign nation is free to make alliances to defend itself and this right cannot be denied by agreements between foreign state leaders (Kukharskyy et al. 2022).
Solodkyy (2024, np.): “[N]egotiations may not solve but increase challenges — or simply postpone them”.
Many Ukrainian authors emphasise that Ukraine has consistently pursued negotiation as a means to resolve the conflict. Efforts to achieve peace in Donbas involved multiple negotiation rounds and agreements (Kazdobina 2024), with President Zelenskyy receiving a mandate from voters in 2019 to prioritise peace, leading to renewed talks under the Normandy format (Minakov 2022). Even after the full-scale invasion began, negotiations continued, including talks at the Belarusian border and attempts by Ukraine’s Presidential Office to arrange a bilateral meeting between the two presidents (Perepelytsia 2023: 14–15). However, these efforts have led Kazdobina (2024), Solodkyy (2024), and others to conclude that negotiations with Russia fail to deliver peace, as any truce would likely serve as an opportunity for Russia to regroup and strengthen its forces.
In an analysis in early 2022 (before the full-scale Russian invasion), Ukrainian-speaking journalist Isobel Koshiw, who is based in Ukraine, wrote, “If Ukraine accepts Russia’s interpretation of the Minsk Agreements, it could face indefinite Russian influence in its affairs” (n.p.). Koshiw’s statement encapsulates a key concern expressed by many Ukrainians regarding peace talks with Russia: such agreements risk entrenching Moscow’s influence and control over Kyiv, particularly through measures like granting special status to Donbas.
According to Ukrainian experts, control over Ukraine is the cornerstone of Russia’s objectives; as Riabchuk (2023 p. 2) asserts, Moscow seeks to “make the remaining free citizens of the democratic nation into voiceless subjects of a despot”. This perspective is crucial for shaping international calls for peace talks. However, this does not preclude the possibility of negotiations being considered by Ukrainians under specific conditions. Oliynyk’s (2024) analysis of recent data from the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology shows that public opinion on negotiations varies across social groups and regions and is influenced by the information sources respondents rely on. Notably, in 2024, fewer Ukrainians than in the previous year fully rejected the option of recognizing Donbas as part of Russia to end the war.
On the other hand, Kukharskyy and others (2022) highlight that, for instance, the question of Crimea should not be discussed without the point of view and testimony of Crimean Tatars who have already experienced violent deportations, occupations and one non-free referendum.
Kurylo (2023, p. 694–695): “[N]o longer accept the unjust and unequal status quo that robbed Ukrainians of our political agency as normal”.
The above quote is from Kurylo’s autoethnographic account, but it summarises what many Ukrainian and other researchers argue: the status quo before the war dismissed Ukrainian agency, and the concerns of Ukrainians were sidelined in the international arena (Kurylo 2023). Yurchenko (2023) believes that discussions on peace between Ukraine and Russia need to simultaneously address the problem of the international legal and security architecture that left previous atrocities unpunished and, hence, facilitated the invasion.
On the other hand, Kukharskyy and others (2022) demand that previous crimes that went unpunished in the International Criminal Court cannot serve as an excuse for not holding Russia accountable. In contrast, they believe that prosecuting Putin supports future peace by serving as an international precedent for state leaders with similar aspirations. Perepelytsia (2023), in turn, warns that after the war, the European security order will be shaped by the winner. If Russia is not defeated, Europe needs to be prepared to face and deter an even more aggressive and empowered Russia.
Conclusion and implications for the Nordic countries
Under the Budapest memorandum, Ukraine received security assurances in exchange for giving up its nuclear weapons – a promise that was later broken. This betrayal has left Ukrainians understandably sceptical of foreign-led proposals for peace. Any credible peace process must be Ukraine-led and -owned. The Nordic countries can support Ukraine by rejecting ‘Westplaining’, challenging Russocentric narratives in international discussions, and amplifying Ukrainian perspectives on peace. Achieving this requires a concerted effort to understand Ukraine’s experience in peace negotiations with Russia – a task made even more pressing in light of the recent U.S. presidential elections.
The Ukrainian perspective has long been marginalised, not only in the production of knowledge about Eastern Europe’s history and politics but also in the international decision-making that shaped the European security order through cooperation between Moscow and the West. Although the war has brought Ukraine to the forefront of global attention, much of the knowledge produced about the conflict continues to overlook Ukrainian voices. As a result, there is a significant risk that a future European security order may once again fail to incorporate the lessons of the war as understood from a Ukrainian standpoint.
As Lehti (2023, p. 58, translated by the author) argues, a “peace that reproduces old imperial and colonial power structures will not be sustainable.” The analyses reviewed for this blog post suggest that ending Russia’s imperialist era in Europe requires placing Kyiv—and other peripheral capitals—at the centre of efforts to develop a new security order.
The blog post is based on an article that was originally published in the Nordic Review of International Studies (3/2024): (open access). A full list of references can be found there.
Featured image: Children Against the War. Kharkiv, Ukraine, 9 June 2016. Source: Colourbox.
