Dual Intent Integration (DII) offers a new way of thinking about refugee integration by preparing simultaneously for staying, returning and maintaining ties across borders. Toni Ahvenainen and Markku Mattila argue that the Ukrainian case may signal a broader resilience turn in EU refugee policy: a shift from planning for one expected future towards keeping several possible futures open.
The war in Ukraine has forced the European Union (EU) to address questions for which its refugee and integration policies were not designed. A key question concerns the future: how can people who may need to live in a host country for years be supported while the possibility of return remains open, both politically and personally? This tension has given rise to new policy approaches, including Dual Intent Integration.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 triggered one of the largest refugee movements in Europe’s recent history. The Temporary Protection Directive (TPD) became a key EU instrument, giving Ukrainians rapid access to residence permits, labour markets, education and basic services, while giving the Union an administratively flexible way to respond to sudden forced displacement. Temporary protection also demonstrated that, in exceptional circumstances, EU refugee policy can adapt rapidly without overwhelming asylum procedures or repeating the institutional crisis of 2015.
This development can be examined through the lens of resilience theory. Resilience shifts the emphasis from the pursuit of complete control to the management of uncertainty. What matters is not that structures remain unchanged, but that they are able to adapt to changing circumstances while maintaining their capacity to function. Here we refer to this development as the resilience turn in EU refugee policy.
The Dual Intent Integration (DII) approach proposed by the OECD considers integration simultaneously in terms of attachment to the host society, possible return and the reconstruction of Ukraine. We examine DII not only as a policy recommendation but also as a manifestation of the resilience turn and a possible indication of a shift in the EU’s governance logic. The central question is whether DII is a case-specific response to the situation of those displaced from Ukraine or points to a broader shift in how refuge, mobility and integration will be understood and governed within the EU in the future.
What does DII mean?
Since 2022, the TPD has functioned as a kind of laboratory for the development of EU refugee and integration policy. Although it established an exceptionally uniform legal framework at EU level, its implementation and measures to support the integration of Ukrainians have varied considerably between and within Member States. The adaptive logic of the TPD is also reflected in EU integration-policy recommendations, which emphasise, for example, the modularity and flexibility of integration measures and the possibility of combining employment, education, language learning and caring responsibilities across different life situations. Resilience thinking is therefore no longer confined to reception but has begun to extend to how the EU conceives integration practices and objectives.
DII takes this idea further in situations where both permanent settlement and possible return constitute realistic future options. The objective of integration is neither exclusively permanent settlement in the host society nor simply waiting for return. Instead, integration policy seeks to strengthen refugees’ human capital, livelihoods and social participation in ways that support their future regardless of whether they remain in the host country or return to Ukraine. Unlike prevailing integration policies in most EU countries, DII explicitly incorporates possible return and reintegration in the country of origin into its objectives. The OECD justifies this by the protracted yet open-ended nature of the Ukrainian refugee situation: host countries need to invest in integration even though many Ukrainians continue to express a desire to return home after the war.
The OECD identifies five ways of achieving this:
- Invest in human capital in ways that benefit both host countries and the reconstruction of Ukraine.
- Develop the recognition of skills and qualifications in both directions.
- Maintain Ukrainian-language proficiency.
- Support the maintenance of economic and digital ties with Ukraine.
- Establish pathways that enable remigration and mobility following return.
DII can thus be understood as an attempt to bring together integration in host countries and the reconstruction of Ukraine within a single policy framework. Its objective is to strengthen human capital and individual capacity that benefit people regardless of where their future lives unfold. Return thereby ceases to be understood as the opposite of integration or as evidence of its failure, becoming one possible outcome instead.
What does DII change?
From the perspective of EU refugee policy, DII is more than a policy recommendation. It challenges an underlying assumption of established protection-based integration policy: that integration primarily aims at long-term attachment to the host society. Under DII, integration simultaneously seeks to support individual well-being, preserve the possibility of return and strengthen the conditions for the reconstruction of the country of origin (Table 1).
Table 1. Comparison of the Prevailing Integration-Policy Approach with Dual Intent Integration Policy.
| Prevailing integration-policy approach | Dual Intent Integration | |
| Assumption about the future | Permanence as the point of departure | Uncertainty as the point of departure |
| Objective of integration | Attachment to the host society | Capacity to act across multiple possible futures |
| Relationship to return | Return separate from integration policy | Return as one possible outcome of integration |
| Policy framework | Integration as a resource for the host country | Integration as a transferable and transnational resource |
What is new is not the coexistence of temporary protection and return as such. Similar arrangements were applied, for example, to refugees from Kosovo in 1999–2000. Rather, DII incorporates possible return into integration-policy objectives and conceives host-country integration as a resource for the future development of the country of origin. It thus replaces the conventional assumption of permanent settlement with uncertainty as the point of departure for integration policy. Its purpose is not to determine the future in advance, but to maintain a system’s capacity to function across several possible future trajectories.
Integration as part of Ukraine’s resilience and reconstruction
DII is closely linked to Ukraine’s resilience and post-war reconstruction. The protracted war has made Ukraine’s economic resilience a central component of its defence capability and national resilience. Sustaining its defence requires a functioning economy, productive capacity, a sufficient population base and conditions that enable those who have moved abroad to return or participate in the country’s future in other ways.
Demographic development is a central issue. Recovery during or after the war depends crucially on the availability of labour and human capital, yet the war has deepened Ukraine’s demographic crisis. Large-scale voluntary return could contribute to socioeconomic and demographic recovery, but whether people return depends on the choices, circumstances and expectations of those who have fled abroad.
Ukraine’s dependence on returncreates a potential divergence of interests between the European Union and Ukraine. For host countries, successfully integrating Ukrainians increases labour supply, skills, and tax revenues, and helps alleviate labour shortages in several countries. At the same time, prolonged residence and stronger ties to host countries may increase the likelihood of permanent settlement. For Ukraine, this may entail a loss of human capital and make it harder to secure the workforce needed for reconstruction. Conversely, an economically strong Ukraine, capable of defending itself and closely integrated with the European Union, is also consistent with the EU’s security interests.
DII can be interpreted as an attempt to manage this tension without requiring integration policy or individual Ukrainians to choose in advance between permanent settlement and return. Skills and capacities developed in host countries may later contribute to Ukraine’s reconstruction through return or various transnational forms of participation and mobility. Host-country integration, Ukraine’s resilience and reconstruction thus become components of the same transnational policy framework.
DII can benefit from the mobility and flexibility the TPD provides. Still, the temporary nature of protection and the legal uncertainty surrounding it may also make simultaneous attachment to two societies institutionally uncertain. Thus, the framework enabling DII also contains mechanisms that may complicate long-term planning for work, family life and integration.
DII from the perspective of the EU refugee regime
From a resilience perspective, the TPD and DII share an ambition to maintain system functioning in circumstances whose outcome cannot be predicted. The emphasis shifts from institutional permanence to adaptive capacity: whether asylum and integration systems at EU and Member State level can change their practices as circumstances change.
An institutionally crucial question remains: what happens to practices developed during a crisis when it becomes protracted or ends? Will they remain temporary exceptions specific to Ukraine, or become established elements of EU refugee policy? DII thus provides an opportunity to examine possible changes in the EU refugee regime, understood as the ensemble of institutional practices, rules and rationalities of governance relating to refugees and protection at EU and Member State level.
Framing DII in these terms does not imply the emergence of an entirely new governance logic. Research on migration regimes has long examined EU migration governance as an interplay of rationalities relating to security, humanitarian protection and economic interests. The TPD and DII can be understood as changes in how these objectives are reconciled within this framework. The TPD combined humanitarian protection, freedom of movement and labour-market participation, whereas DII links host-country integration to Ukraine’s reconstruction and broader EU security interests.
The resilience turn would therefore primarily entail a shift towards more adaptive forms of governance within the EU. The relationships between security, humanitarian protection and economic interests are not predetermined; rather, their relative weight can be adjusted as circumstances change. The crucial question is whether this logic will remain specific to Ukraine or become institutionalised in EU refugee policy as a means of governing other protracted refugee situations characterised by uncertain futures.
At the same time, this development entails significant normative tensions. The application of the TPD to Ukrainians has already prompted debate about selectivity in EU protection and why Ukrainians were rapidly granted rights and freedom of movement restricted for other refugee groups. DII extends this question further. If integration policy is expected to simultaneously serve individual protection, host Member States’ labour-market needs, reconstruction of the country of origin and geopolitical objectives, its normative purpose also changes. This shift makes the relationship between the universality of protection and strategic selectivity central: is DII possible precisely because of Ukraine’s exceptional geopolitical position?
Discussions of resilience have long distinguished between recovery (‘bouncing back’), adaptation and deeper transformation. All three emphasise the capacity to function amid uncertainty and disruption. Yet this also points to a potential blind spot in resilience thinking. If policy success is assessed primarily by how effectively a system adapts to crises and maintains its capacity to function, institutions’ long-term direction and normative objectives may recede into the background. Adaptive governance can be effective without resolving what kind of societal development the policy is ultimately intended to promote. The strength of resilience – the capacity to function without certainty about the future – may therefore also constitute its central problem.
DII does not yet demonstrate the emergence of a new EU refugee regime. However, it is no longer merely a conceptual policy recommendation from 2023. According to the OECD’s 2026 assessment, between 2023 and 2025, Ukraine and host countries developed practices that combined socioeconomic integration, investment in human capital, two-way recognition of skills and qualifications, the maintenance of ties with Ukraine, and the reduction of barriers to possible return. For the time being, however, these remain fragmented and partial practices rather than a coherent EU integration model.
In the OECD’s 2026 report, the policy logic of DII extends beyond the original staying–returning binary. The report emphasises the portability of social protection, flexible cross-border mobility and dual anchoring, whereby return can occur gradually while maintaining ties with both Ukraine and the host country. Alongside staying and returning, this introduces gradual, reversible and potentially cyclical mobility.
At the same time, Ukraine’s reconstruction is decoupled from the assumption that those who have moved abroad must return permanently. Ukrainians remaining abroad can contribute to the country’s development through skills, networks, investment and other transnational connections. The object of policy is therefore not only the physical return of people but also the maintenance of institutional connections through which human and economic capital can move across borders.
DII thus makes visible a model of governance in which integration is no longer conceived as a unidirectional movement towards permanent settlement. Staying, returning, remigration, dual anchoring and transnational participation can instead be understood as parallel future trajectories. If this thinking becomes institutionalised in EU refugee policy beyond Ukraine, it will no longer constitute an isolated exception but a significant shift in the governance logic of EU refugee policy.
The Ukrainian case therefore indicates what a more resilient EU refugee regime might look like: a system defined not by adherence to a single predetermined future, but by its institutional capacity to keep multiple possible future trajectories open and reconcile divergent objectives. Yet this is also where the model’s central tension lies. The better the system adapts to uncertainty, the more important it becomes to ask what kind of future EU refugee policy is ultimately intended to create.
