The Russian invasion of Ukraine has prompted the Zelensky executive to adopt a new Mobilisation Act. In this blog post, Geir Flikke and Aadne Aasland analyse the process of adoption and public perceptions of the law, drawing on survey and voting data collected for the VALREF (RCN #301249) project.
Introduction
In December 2023, President Zelensky announced that Ukraine would need another 500,000 soldiers to change the dynamics on the battlefield. The announcement was motivated by the need for fresh manpower, and the need to enable those who had been fighting for almost two years to regain combat strength. The government followed up by sending a legislative proposal “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine on Improving Certain Issues of Mobilisation, Military Registration and Military Service” to the Rada on 25 December 2023. However, on 11 January 2024, it was withdrawn, and resubmitted only on 6 February 2024. It was finally adopted on 15/16 April 2024 (law #3633-ix). By that time, it was no longer a single legislative act, but a package of amendments to 16 different laws.[i]
The legislative process was a complex one. As such, it is a test case for institutional and societal resilience, and in broader terms also for trust in political institutions. Although the willingness to defend Ukraine has been resilient, the adoption of a legal amendment of this scale and consequence might produce new cleavages. After 992 days of defensive warfare (as of 11 November 2024), the costs of war have grown substantially, and drafting new reserves could potentially create new divisions. Moreover, we need to know more about how Ukrainians respond to the political reforms prompted by war. A recent report and blog post from the Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research (NIBR) concluded that the new Mobilisation Act would not only impact Ukrainians currently residing in Ukraine, but also the millions of Ukrainians who have fled to or live in other countries. To examine this assumption, we draw on a survey commissioned by West Virginia University/ University of Oslo and fielded by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in June 2024 – one conducted in government-controlled territories of Ukraine (the national sample), and the other among Ukrainian refugees in Europe (the refugee sample).[ii]
We analyse the process of adopting the law and public perceptions of it. By pairing institutional processes with survey results, we examine some core assumptions in the VALREF project, where we assumed that convergence around national values could a) create sustained trust in institutions, and b) lead to a more open and transparent system in Ukraine. Aligning with these core research questions, we use the adoption of the Mobilisation Act as a test case for checking public resonance to legislative processes.
The Mobilization Act: The legislative process
In January 2024, two presidential proposals of primary importance were presented to the Rada – an amendment to the procedures for using state registries for military registration, and the introduction of changes to the administrative codex establishing administrative liability for violations of the regime of martial law. These draft laws involved complex voting procedures in the Rada that could potentially entail delays. However, the Ministry of Defence held a hearing with Rada MPs in January; and on 6 February 2024, the Rada adopted a presidential decree extending the terms of mobilisation with a simple majority (323 for). On the same day, the Rada majority adopted a legislative act that considered adoption of the Mobilisation Act as urgent, and aimed to speed up the process of introducing changes to the legislation on mobilisation (238 for). On 7 February 2024, the first draft of the Mobilisation Act was adopted as a basis for parliamentary discussion (243 for).
On 10 April 2024, the Mobilisation Act was reintroduced in full as a law package that introduced multiple changes to legislative acts. Overall, the Rada voted on altogether 211 amendments in 19 hours. On April 10, 181 amendments to the Mobilisation Act were turned down; the Rada voted a last time on 11 April 2024, at 1:30 am, and reconvened later that morning, with a vote of 282 for resuming voting on 30 additional amendments. The Act was adopted in a final reading on that same day, with 283 votes in favour, and was signed into law on 16 April 2024.
Table 1 offers an analysis of the average voting on 181 proposed MP amendments. The total number of amendments is not known, but one amendment that was submitted to voting on the first day had the number 4,265.[iii] As the table indicates, most of these amendments were rejected by a majority of “did not vote”. Hardly any MPs voted against the amendments; most amendments were discarded by a “did not vote” option. We do not have data showing how the pro-European, centrist party Servant of the People voted on these amendments.
Table 1. Voting on proposed amendments to the Mobilization Act. Mean numbers and percentages of different voting outcomes (N=181).
| For | Against | Abstained | Did not vote | Total | |
| Mean number of votes | 31.6 | 1.0 | 21.5 | 198.1 | 252.1 |
| Mean share of votes (%) | 12.4 | 0.4 | 8.2 | 79.0 | 100.0 |
Table 2 provides a similar analysis of the 30 votes on amendments held on 11 April 2024, where all amendments were adopted. In the final reading, the law was adopted with 283 for, 1 against, 49 abstentions, and 18 “did not vote”.
Table 2. Voting on the adoption of the amendments: mean numbers and percentages of different voting outcomes (N=32).*
| For | Against | Abstained | Did not vote | Total | |
| Mean number of votes | 322.6 | 0.7 | 2.8 | 28.9 | 355.1 |
| Mean share of votes (%) | 90.8 | 0.2 | 0.8 | 8.1 | 100.0 |
The presidential majority in the Rada was instrumental in passing the law – a fact that marks a departure from Ukrainian politics prior to 2019, when the system has been seen as a somewhat particular system of checks and balances, sometimes also a system where substantial disruptions and Rada blockades have occurred. Regardless, we must assume that the consolidated system under Zelensky is increasingly exposed to issues of trust and transparency. A crucial factor in this respect would be popular perceptions of the law.
Survey analysis: perceptions of the law
The new legislation has sparked mixed reactions in Ukraine. Many Ukrainians see the law as necessary given the ongoing war with Russia – but there have been significant concerns and criticisms voiced in Ukrainian media as well. The VALREF survey found that more respondents opposed the new law than supported it (see Figure 1).[iv] Just over one third (34 percent) expressed partial or complete opposition, against 28 percent being mostly or fully in favour of the new legislation.
Figure 1. Level of support and opposition to the Mobilisation Act, in percent (N=2416)
Certain segments of the population are significantly more likely to oppose the law than others. Figure 2 shows the levels of full or partial opposition among three groups: non-movers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and externally displaced individuals. Displacement status alone is not a decisive factor in explaining these differences in attitudes, as IDPs show similar views to those who have not been displaced. However, externally displaced Ukrainians express considerably stronger opposition to the law compared to the other two groups. This opposition may stem from concerns about lack of adequate protection from the Ukrainian state if they or their family members fail to comply with the law. Additionally, fear of social stigmatization could make them less inclined to support the law.
Figure 2. Percentage mostly or completely opposed to the Mobilisation Act, by displacement status (N=2330). *
*Those answering ‘do not know’ or refusing to answer are not included in this and the following Figures.
Although support for the law does not differ significantly between men and women, age plays a substantial role, as shown in Figure 3. It is particularly those in age groups most likely to be personally affected by the law who express opposition. A sharp divide exists between those under and over 50 years of age.
Figure 3. Percentage mostly or completely opposed to the Mobilisation Act, by age (N=2330).
Opposition and support for the law are evenly distributed across Ukraine’s macro-regions. The distance to the frontline and direct experiences with the war do not seem to influence attitudes toward the Mobilisation Act significantly (see Figure 4).
Figure 4. Percentage mostly or completely opposed to the Mobilisation Act, by respondents’ macro-region before the full-scale invasion in 2022 (N=2330).
We find that levels of institutional trust are strongly correlated with attitudes towards the law. For instance, less than 30 percent of respondents who express complete trust or mostly trust Ukraine’s Armed Forces (N=1992) oppose the law, while close to 80 percent of respondents who express full or mostly distrust (N=125) are opposed (see Figure 5).
Figure 5. Percentage mostly or completely opposed to the Mobilisation Act, by respondents’ level of trust in the Ukrainian Armed Forces (N=2330).
Conclusion
Legislative work in times of war is extremely demanding. The fact that the Rada still debates and adopts laws is thus a good indication of institutional resilience. However, we cannot know for certain how legislative amendments of this magnitude will affect the larger population. Our preliminary findings indicate that those who see themselves as most affected by the law are the least likely to support it, and that trust in government institutions, international organizations, and leadership significantly affect public attitudes. A more significant finding is the fact that regional differences do not appear to have any bearing on perceptions of the law. This may indicate that Ukrainians are more unified across the regions than what has been assumed. We cannot conclude that the Mobilisation Act has had broad support among survey respondents, however; we must consider the context of adoption. This survey was conducted shortly after the introduction of the law, and many respondents had probably not fully grasped the consequences of it. It remains to be seen whether the law might create new cleavages between Ukrainians abroad and those remaining in the country.
The picture shows President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky giving a speech in the Verkhovna Rada on 3 May 2022. https://www.flickr.com/photos/165930373@N06/52048815400
[i] Amendments were among others introduced to the Labor Code, the Administrative Procedure Law, the Law on Social Protection of Military Personnel and Families, and the laws on Local Administration, Local Self-Government, and Civilian and Military Administrations.
[ii] The national sample comprised 2,015 completed interviews, while the refugee sample included 401 interviews. The survey is co-financed by the VALREF project at the University of Oslo (project number #301249).
[iii] On 10 April, amendments were not ranged by numbers, whereas on 11 April, they were. This suggests that the voting procedure on the 2nd day was more orderly.
[iv] The question reads as follows: The Verkhovna Rada adopted a new Law on Mobilization, which was signed by the President and entered into force on May 18. What is your position regarding the Law? Rate on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is strongly oppose, 3 is neither oppose nor support, 5 is completely support?
